International Le 19 juin 2013

A More Profound Look at the Turkey Protests: Is Taksim Tahrir? “What went wrong?”

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A More Profound Look at the Turkey Protests: Is Taksim Tahrir? “What went wrong?”

« Peaceful environmentalists » protesting for trees but pillaging the history. This Ottoman era fountain has been sprayed, its brilliant ornaments and inscriptions were damaged.

Since the final days of May, nation-wide demonstrations in Turkey have taken place against Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) government. Mainstream Western media coverage and analysis have labeled these demonstrations the « Turkish Spring, » a questionable reference to the Arab Spring.1 In order to explain the recent protests in Turkey’s Taksim square, the majority of experts have compared them to the ones which happened in Tahrir square of Cairo in the 2010-11 period.2 The term « Turkish Spring » has to be deconstructed, and those who equate Taksim to Tahrir should reconsider the history of democratisation and the backgrounds of Turkey’s opposition and ruling parties, namely the AKP and the Republican People’s Party (CHP).

In fact Erdogan’s AKP is a democratically elected party, has attempted to end the long-lasting Kurdish-Turkish conflict and provided freedoms to the other minorities in the country, and initiated Turkey’s EU accession negotiations. The largest Eurosceptic party in Turkey3, in contrast, has been the main opposition party the CHP, which also has a very questionable history of humanitarian crimes and ethnic assimilation projects towards Kurds, Greeks, Armenians and Jews.4 It is thus difficult to argue that there is an Arab Spring-like movement against a dictator in Turkey. AKP’s liberal moves in politics and economics clash with this dubious definition. However the considerable majority of the protesters have expressed their support to the ex-military juntas by inviting army to intervene in Turkish politics. Other leftist-nationalist groups and extreme leftists of Turkey have also played a role in these nation-wide protests. Yet, there is no single political ideal to this movement, it is mainly composed of people from the 50 percent of people who did not vote for Erdogan, and the majority of them are the voters of the CHP, who incited four military interventions and numerous ethnic assimilation projects. It is incontestable that within his party and country, Erdogan is turning to an unavoidable autocracy, as the recent Sledgehammer court case unveiled republican-led coup attempts to Erdogan’s government, which were also supported by other marginal opposition groups who are protesting against the government on the grounds of environmentalism in Taksim.

Erdogan’s party is extremely popular, unlike the overthrown Arab dictators. In the last elections, it gained the 50 percent of the total votes. As the main opposition party the CHP gained only 26 percent of votes. What has made Erdogan more powerful has been the eradication of pre-2002 parties from the political arena which left Turkish parliament to four major players: The AKP (Muslim democrat, neo-liberals), CHP (Nationalist, republicans), MHP (Nationalists, far right), and the BDP (Leftist, pro-Kurdish). Erdogan’s opposition has been extremely weak on an electoral basis. Furthermore, the Gezi Park events show us a very interesting unification of the previously clashing of opposition movements, with the majority of protesters either being supporters of leftist parties or the nationalist republicans and demanding an action against the Muslim-democrat and neoliberal AKP. Democratic accountability of the AKP has not been limited to the 50 percent of the Turkish electorate, as the leaders conveyed a message that they represent the whole country even if they did not vote for the AKP. In practice, one may question whether Erdogan really represents the other 50 percent. In the recent days, the limitation of alcohol sales, existing internet filters for adult web sites, and the destruction of a tiny green space incited thousands to protest against the government in the streets. On the grounds of environmentalism, protesters are critical of Erdogan’s politics, which is supported by the majority. That is to say, political minorities want a voice which is above and beyond their numbers in the Turkish democracy. Of course while the mode of action of the protesters is problematic, so are the suppression tactics of the police in Turkey.

Among the Gezi protesters a widespread vandalism threatens the public safety and the image of Turkey, which has been the fourth biggest tourist destination in the world in 2012. Bus stops, public buses, and shops are pillaged by certain groups within the protesters. It is clear that that riot police has employed a massive amount of force against these protestors, though it is not very different from Spanish, Italian, Greek, and British police tactics. In Europe similar amounts of forces were employed to pacify the protesters against austerity measures. None of these European events were considered as a British, Greek or Spanish “Spring” or “Summer.” All in all, Turkey’s neo-liberal Muslim-democrat party made a mistake by not listening the voices of the diverse critics against the AKP government, which exasperated thousands of young men and women from the opposition groups. However, the mainstream terminology used by the Western media and experts is highly problematic. The most critical thing to note and address should be the excessive international media coverage of these events at a time when the deadly blasts are killing dozens in Iraq, Syria, Myanmar and elsewhere in the world.

Adnan Riza Güzel
MA Candidate in International History & Politics @IHEID
BA in History, Koc University


[3]http://changingturkey.com/2010/10/11/causes-and-types-of-euroscepticism-by-the-republican-peoples-party-chp-and-nationalist-movement-party-mhp-of-turkey-by-can-buyukbay/

[4]See the 1934 Thrace pogroms against Jews, the Dersim Massacre in 1937-1938, the Capital Tax of 1942 [Varlik Vergisi] took place during the single party era under the leadership of CHP [RPP]:

i)http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00313220600634238#.UcDvwfYpavU

ii)http://igitur-archive.library.uu.nl/let/2007-0320-200735/UUindex.html

iii)Genocide of the Kurds” by Martin van Bruinessen in “The Widening Circle of Genocide” by Israel W. Charney, Transaction Publishers, 1994.

iv)http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00263207208700205?journalCode=fmes20#.UcDwt_YpavU

Commentaires

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Ar Ak

Hello, I do agree about the false comparaison of mainstream media who as usual tries to put events into boxes…

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Adnan Riza Güzel

One last point: protests may be considered also in favour of Erdogan from another point of view, he's now able…

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Adnan Riza Güzel

Thank you for your message. To be honest, I received a good question. I will try to answer it. Firstly,…

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Ar Ak

Hello, I do agree about the false comparaison of mainstream media who as usual tries to put events into boxes and simplifies everything and makes false deductions.

However I also think that you’re analysis is very « political scientist » and misrepresents a big part of what is happening on the ground.

First of all (and shockingly), as someone who has studied history in Koç it is rather upsetting that you mention that the « media coverage is excessive » while failing to point out the historic aspect of this movement. Yes, it is a very diverse movement which cannot be encompassed by any single ideology. But it is also a historic movement in Turkey and many new things have emerged. To see that, one should detached one self from simply reading institutional politics and to further look into society. One thing that all of the groups who participate at the protest say (I can assure this for we have been interviewing all the groups and individuals that we can in the last weeks here) is that :

1) it is the first time ever that people and groups who would never talk to each other, have actually been trying to understand each other and work together. this doesn’t mean that their differences have been resolved but it is a historical first step in solving the huge problem of divisions and polarization in Turkish society.

2) it is the first time that a mass of ordinary people from all sorts of socio-economic, political, ethnic, religious and gender backgrounds have stopped been afraid to stand up against their government and state. people of Turkey have been terrorized since the 1970′ and this is coming to an end.

3) all this has deep connections with many other things in older and recent Turkish history. I’ll just state recent things : AKP’s urbanization projects to transform cities (esp. Istanbul) into rent and tourism oriented businesses, gentrification of historical neighborhoods and pushing out minorities out of cities, paternalists politics and intervention in people’s daily lives, control of unions and repression of workers and strikes (which were practically impossible in Turkey until recently, see Turkish airlines ground workers strike), womens movements, kurdish peace talks with AKP, anti-war, anti-imperialism which equates to nationalism here (which is obviously a problem). etc. etc. etc.

Theses are only some of the very important factors that are playing a huge role in this movement which is only starting and the effects will only reveal themselves in a long-term development.

Basically what I’m trying to say is that I find your analysis extremely simplifying and also an incorrect portrayal of what is happening on the ground and not only in institutional politics. Furthermore, the way you portray « police tactics » and « protestors vandalism » is not only dead wrong but also misrepresenting and a wrong analysis. Police in Europe don’t shoot protesters in the head (like police in Turkey) and then get released a few weeks later. The level of police brutality and the way it has been conducted and also legitimized by the AKP regime is nothing like Europe and it is actually falling into Erdogan’s rhetoric to say that in an analysis article.

To conclude, I would say that while trying to formulate a legitimate critic of mainstream media, you have fallen in the exact same trap of comparing and simplifying. Comparing with Europe and simplifying to a certain aspect of institutional politics.

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Adnan Riza Güzel

One last point: protests may be considered also in favour of Erdogan from another point of view, he’s now able to attract the recently dispersed Muslim-democrat voters to his party, against the secular-Militarist opposition. He’s able to show that his party, and the liberal democracy has been threatened with violent protests. This polarisation definitely provides more votes to AKP.

Kind Regards,

ARG

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Sophie

Hi! Thanks a lot for your article! I like discovering new point of view and I totally agree with you about the Turkish Spring idea.
I was just wandering something about your opinion: If I get it, according to you, the people protesting only represents the people who didn’t vote for Erdogan previously? I mean, I have the feeling that you consider the « Gezi Park » as an opportunity for them to express their discontentement. But don’t you think that people who had previously voted for him can change their mind, especially when they see the measures used? (Im thinking about police violence, alcohol measures and that kind of things) I do agree with you that the opposition may have started this movement, however, the whole Turkish population seems to support it.
I would be very curious to have your point of view about this idea. Thanks a lot!

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Adnan Riza Güzel

Thank you for your message. To be honest, I received a good question. I will try to answer it. Firstly, you are certainly right that in the last twelve months, Erdogan lost a very considerable amount of his votes, as surveys show us. Also within his party, there are challenges to his leadership, but all these initiatives and events cannot make him weak enough to leave the post. Mostly because these challenges are not strong enough, he is an extremely powerful leader, not only in his party also in the country. The forthcoming division of Turkish votes can make him weaker, but not enough to overthrow his party from the leadership of governance. In 2002 elections, AK party gained the 34 percent of the votes, but it became the first party and gained the governance without any sound participation from the opposition. Although they are offered to participate after each elections, opposition leaders refused all these offers, which have to be analysed in detail. Currently, our recent polls suggest that overall support has been slightly less than 50 percent. Estimates vary around %38 to %48. In all cases, AKP keeps its leadership. Indeed, a considerable body of the AKP voters have been tired of Erdogan. Although the party is relatively more successful in macroeconomics, health, security and peace, compared to former governments; it is unable to transform the educational conditions and transport needs of the growing young population. I don’t see unemployment as a big threat, as Turkey has been doing better than the crisis torn Europe. Yet, the youth unemployment and the rising amount of dissatisfied young people will make AKP weaker, year by year. What is most problematic is the weak and unqualified nature of the opposition parties. Experts and opposition Turks are prevalently debating a reformation within AK Party and Turkish politics. However few experts mention a possible reformation within the main opposition party, which requires bolder ones, in my view. These protests are the crystal clear signs of the failure of the opposition party, as well. Most voters, and young people don’t have an alternative in opposition. According to them, Erdogan is the best one among the many bad options. Or in other proper words, he is the least problematic one among many bad leaders of the Turkish politics. Few Turkish politicians are able to understand the youth of 21st century, who will be acquiring the legal age of voting, for the first time in the coming elections. A sharp weakening in AK Party’s rule is unavoidable; yet, it will remain the most powerful one among many others, as the opposition is unable to gather good leaders. I don’t agree with the mainstream Western media representation that the whole Turkey supports these movements. Several polls prove that the majority of the protestors support the left-wing parties.

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